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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite repeated efforts of legislators over the past decade, Colorado
does not have an obscenity statute that has withstood constitutional chal-
lenge. Legislative enactments in the area have either been vetoed by the
governor,' struck down as unconstitutional by the state supreme court,2 or
repealed by the legislature in favor of a "tougher" law.
3 
-
The legislature's most recent attempts to control obscenity were embod-
ied in two statutes enacted during the 1981 session. One statute prohibits
the promotion of obscene material, 4 and the other statute controls children's
exposure to any sexually explicit material.5 Rulings at the trial court level
have found significant constitutional defects in both of these statutes, and
challenges to them are presently pending before the Colorado Supreme
Court.
6
In Miller v. California,7 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that obscenity is not protected speech under the first amendment
to the Constitution and set forth specific guidelines for state legislatures to
follow in regulating obscenity.8 In light of the "how to" instructions con-
tained in the Miller decision, many people in Colorado may wonder why the
legislature has had such difficulty drafting obscenity legislation acceptable to
all three branches of government. The following story of one legislative de-
bate is paradigmatic of the problems the legislature has faced with the ob-
scenity issue.
During the 1976 session, the legislature considered several approaches to
outlawing obscenity 9 in the wake of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in People v. Tabron,10 which had declared the prior obscenity statute unconsti-
tutional for failure to comply with the Miller standards. Republican Repre-
sentative Sam Zakhem introduced a severe bill"I making the promotion of
obscenity a Class 4 Felony. When his bill was not favorably reported from
1. S. 450, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1979), vetoed by the Governor May 20, 1979
(veto sustained by the House, 1979 Colo. H.J. 2298).
2. People v. New Horizons, Inc., 616 P.2d 106 (1980); People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149,
544 P.2d 372 (1975).
3. S. 447, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 982, repealed the 1976 obscenity statute enacted by H.B.
1272, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
4. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-101 to -106 (Supp. 1981).
5. CLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-501 to -504 (Supp. 1981).
6. See infra notes 106, 213, and accompanying text.
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8. Id at 23-24. For a discussion of these guidelines see supra notes 50-54 and accompany-
ing text.
9. H.B. 1116, H.B. 1197, and H.B. 1199, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
10. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1975). See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
11. H.B. 1197, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976), 1976 Colo. H.J. 220.
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committee, Zakhem vowed: "The battle is not over; I'm going to try to put
the teeth back in that bill."'
12
During a floor debate on the alternative bill,' 3 Zakhem proposed an
amendment to outlaw "any ultimate sexual act, normal or perverted.'
4
Representative Ted Bendelow criticized the Zakhem amendment for making
illegal "a husband and wife exercising their normal marital rights in the
privacy of their own bedroom.' 5 Another representative suggested that
Zakhem "should be given a lifetime membership in Zero Population
Growth.' 1 6 Zakhem's amendment thereupon went down to defeat by a vote
of fifty-seven to one.17
Actually the written version of Representative Zakhem's amendment
was not as Draconian as his colleagues had feared from his verbal descrip-
tion. But the above vignette illustrates the confusion that can arise when
legislators, with differing values and consequently different approaches, try
to formulate obscenity legislation. Some Colorado legislators have been pri-
marily concerned with "cracking down" on obscenity; others have focused
on technical adherence to the Miller standards; while still others have been
primarily interested in limiting the possible infringement of freedom of
speech by obscenity statutes. The attempts to combine these different values
and approaches into one statute through the process of amendment has led
to defective statutes. Rather than trying to interpret away the inconsisten-
cies, Colorado courts have been content to strike down an entire statute or
excise key portions and let the legislature continue to struggle.
This article will explore the history of obscenity law in Colorado, with
special attention to the constitutional defects in past legislation and potential
defects in the 1981 statutes now before the Colorado Supreme Court.
II. PRE-MILLER OBSCENITY LAW
A. Stalutog,
One remarkable aspect of obscenity law in Colorado is the total lack of
litigation in this area before the 1970's, despite the fact that Colorado has
had an obscenity statute since 1885.18 The statute passed in that year pro-
hibited the sale, possession, or exhibition of any "obscene, lewd, or indecent,
or lascivious" publication. 19 In an attempt-not entirely successful-to go
beyond tautology in its definition, the statute specifically banned "any news-
paper, or magazine, containing pictures of nude, or partly nude, men or
12. Denver Post, Feb. 13, 1976 at 3, col. 1. The bill was officially postponed "indefinitely"
on Feb. 26, 1976 Colo. H.J. 448.
13. H.B. 1199, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976). Zakhem also co-sponsored an-
other bill, H.R. 1116, which provided that promotion of obscene material to minors was a class
I misdemeanor. This bill was killed in committee a month after it was introduced. 1976 Colo.
Hj. 123, 448.
14. 1976 Colo. H.J. 588.
15. Smut Bill Okayed, But Sex Is Still Legal, Denver Post, Mar. 7, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
16. Id
17. 1976 Colo. H.J. 588.




women, or pictures of men or women in indecent attitudes or positions."
'20
Presumably, under this statute a person could be sent to the county jail for
up to one year just for selling a picture of a lady or gentleman who, although
fully clothed, had adopted an indecent attitude. The same statute had pro-
visions outlawing instruments used for "self-pollution," birth control devices
or medicines of any kind, and abortifacients.
2'
This Victorian nightmare, if read out loud in a room of people even
minimally versed in constitutional law, probably would provoke laughter.
Nevertheless, the basic 1885 statute, including all of the language quoted
above, remained the law of Colorado until 1969.22 In that year Colorado
passed its first modern obscenity statute, 23 which attempted to comply with
the prevailing United States Supreme Court authority in the area. The stat-
ute defined "obscene" as material that appealed to the "prurient" interest in
sex and was "utterly without redeeming social value."'24 Those were two of
the elements the Supreme Court had indicated it would look for in state
obscenity statutes in the 1966 case, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts.
2 5
B. Early Cases-Prior Restraints
The first obscenity case to be decided in Colorado, People ex rel. McKevitt
v. Harvey,26 arose under the old statute.2 7 The issue in Harvey was not the
statute's definition of obscenity, but rather the statute's provisions for the
search for and seizure of obscene materials.28 The case involved a two and
one-half hour search of the defendant's place of business by Denver police,
who were armed with a search warrant. 29 During the search, the officers
seized several hundred articles "which the oftcers examined and determined
to be obscene."
30
The material was used as a basis for the granting of a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting the sale of the material. 31 When, at a later hear-
ing, the judge refused to continue the restraining order as to all of the
publications, the district attorney appealed. 32  The defendant cross-ap-




22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-9-17 (1963) repealed at 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 321, 325.
23. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-28-1 to -10 (1969).
24. Id at § 40-28-1.
25. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). A third element prescribed by the Supreme Court, but not
mentioned explicitly in the Colorado statute, was that the material in question must be "pa-
tently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters." Id.
26. 176 Colo. 447, 491 P.2d 563 (1971).
27. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-9-17 to -27 (1963).
28. 176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 564-65.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-9-17 (1963) (which permits the issuance of search warrants
under specified circumstances). See 176 Colo. at 448, 491 P.2d at 563.
30. 176 Colo. at 449, 491 P.2d at 563 (emphasis added).
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Justice William Erickson, who has authored virtually all the majority
opinions dealing with the issue of obscenity, wrote the Harvey opinion in
which the Colorado Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme authoriz-
ing the search warrant was defective. This defect arose because the statute
did not provide for an adversary hearing to determine whether the materials
to be seized were in fact obscene prior to the search. 34 Instead, the statute
impermissibly left the determination of whether materials were obscene to
the discretion of police officers, 35 a practice that had been expressly con-
demned by the United States Supreme Court in Marcus v. Search Warrant.
36
The Colorado court went on to state that any restraint of expression,
"which is imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits
must be limited to the shortest fixed time period compatible with sound judi-
cial resolution. '37 The court acknowledged the New York injunctive proce-
dure, upheld in the United States Supreme Court case of Kngsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 38 as being an acceptable form of prior restraint. The New York
statute provided for "a hearing one day after joinder of issue and for a final
decision two days after termination of the hearing."
'39
The Colorado court's acceptance of the Kingsley case was not significant
at the time of Harvey because recent revisions of the Colorado obscenity code
had eliminated provisions for restraints on material prior to a judicial deter-
mination that the material was obscene.' Newer obscenity statutes, how-
ever, such as the 1981 law, have gone back to providing for restraints prior to
a judicial determination of obscenity. 4 ' The procedure set forth in the 1981
statute appears, in some respects, to comply with the New York procedure
approved in Harvey and Kingsley. 42 Nevertheless, one subsection of the 1981
statute provides for temporary restraining orders in "exigent circumstances"
if the underlying action is "commenced on the earliest possible date."' 43 This
provision may run afoul of the holding in Harvey that prior restraints must be
limited to the "shortest fixred time period compatible with sound judicial
resolution."
44
The Harvey case ruled out searches as means for gathering evidence for
obscenity prosecutions until an adversary hearing has been held and the
materials have been adjudged to be obscene.45 Law enforcement officers can
34. Id at 450, 491 P.2d at 564 (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)).
35. 176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 565.
36. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). In Marcus the Court held that pornography could not be dealt
with as other items of "contraband" during a search. Id at 730-31.
37. 176 Colo. at 150, 491 P.2d at 564 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
38. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
39. Harvey, 176 Colo. at 452, 491 P.2d at 565. Joinder of issue would occur in these cases
when the defendant answers the complaint for injunctive relief. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 750
(rev. 5th ed. 1979).
40. Harvey, 176 Colo. at 452, 491 P.2d at 565. The court discussed the changes brought
about by CoLO. REV. STAT. § 40-7-105 (1971), which provided for injunctive relief only after
the material in question had been determined obscene by means of a criminal proceeding in
which someone was convicted for promoting it. Id.
41. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-103 (Supp. 1981).
42. See id at § 18-7-103(5).
43. Id. at § 18-7-103(3).
44. 176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 564 (emphasis added).
45. Id., 491 P.2d at 565.
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otherwise acquire such evidence by purchasing obscene material from its
purveyors or by subpoenaing the material. It was the subpoena procedure
that was challenged in Houston v. Manerbino,46 which was the next recorded
obscenity case in Colorado. In that case, the district attorney submitted to
the court a policeman's affidavit that described in minute detail sexual acts
being portrayed in films exhibited by the defendant, who was charged with
violating the obscenity statute.4 7 The affidavit served as the basis for the
issuance of a subpoena requiring the defendant to produce the films for the
purpose of an adversary hearing.
48
The Colorado Supreme Court held that such a subpoena was not an
impermissible prior restraint, because "[s]ome means had to be devised to
obtain and preserve the moving pictures for the purpose of conducting an
adversary hearing to determine whether the films were obscene as a matter
of law."
49
III. THE DETERMINATION OF OBSCENITY AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Miller v. California
The Burger court's major contribution to obscenity law, Miller v. Califor-
ma,50 was designed tomake the regulation of obscenity easier by providing
"concrete guidelines" for state statutes.51 The decision did not have that
effect in Colorado.
The Court in Miler tried to establish guidelines which would ensure
that obscenity laws could regulate only "hard core" pornography. 52 For ma-
terial to be denominated as such, a trier of fact would have to decide, ac-
cording to Miller, that:
(a) [Tihe average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ....
(b) [T]he work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law
(c) [T]he work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.
53
The Md/er decision went on to set forth examples of the types of depic-
tions that could be prohibited under part (b) of the above standard:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the
46. 185 Colo. 1, 521 P.2d 166 (1974).
47. Id at 4, 521 P.2d at 167.
48. Id at 5, 521 P.2d at 167.
49. Id at 8, 521 P.2d at 169.
50. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
51. Id at 29.
52. Id
53. Id at 24.
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genitals.
5 4
B. The First Post-Miller Decision
In People v. Berger,55 the Colorado Supreme Court had its first opportu-
nity to examine an obscenity prosecution in light of the Mier standards.
The case involved an owner of a Colorado Springs magazine exchange who
was convicted of promoting obscenity.56 The defendant sold a police officer
magazines that the court described as follows:
The photographs contained in the magazines depict nude male
and female models posed in various positions. Although the
magazines portray male and female genitalia, none of the photo-
graphs depicts sexual intercourse, masturbation, fellatio, cunnilin-
gus, or other explicitly sexual conduct. In addition to the
photographs, all of the magazines, except one, contained literary
articles in the form of short stories comparable to those found in
present day "confession" type magazines.
57
The statute underlying this prosecution was essentially the same statute
that the court overturned as unconstitutional two years later in People v.
Tabron.58 But the court avoided the constitutional issue in Berger by relying
on the principle enunciated one month earlier in Houston v. Manerbino, that
the question of whether materials were obscene was in the first instance a
matter of law for the court to decide. 59 Focusing on a statement in Mi/er
that states could prohibit only patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct,
the court in Berger stated: "In our view, while the photographs depict male
and female genitals in a non-turgid state, they do not reveal any form of
sexual conduct which could be categorized as 'hard core' pornography or
which would be patently offensive to most people."'60 Thus, the court found
the magazines to be not obscene as a matter of federal constitutional law,
and did not have to reach the question of whether the statute complied with
the Miller test. 6' By describing the threshold point in the test as being tur-
gidity versus limpness of genitals, however, the court in Berger apparently
ignored the comment in the Miller opinion that a state statute could regulate
under part (b) of the standard "lewd exhibition of the genitals."
62
Nevertheless, the Berger court's intentions in setting up such a standard
can be better understood from the following comment: "In fact, a number
of magazines on today's news stands which appeal to large segments of the
community exhibit photographs of the nude human body which are compa-
rable to those contained in the seven magazines which provide the basis for
54. Id. at 25.
55. 185 Colo. 85, 521 P.2d 1244 (1974).
56. Id at 86, 521 P.2d at 1244.
57. Id at 87, 521 P.2d at 1245.
58. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976). See infta notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
59. Berger, 185 Colo. at 88, 521 P.2d at 1245 (also citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964)).
60. 185 Colo. at 89, 521 P.2d at 1246.
61. Id.
62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
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the charges in this case."
6 3
The court in Berger seemingly wanted to ensure that popular
"centerfold" magazines, such as Playboy, Penthouse, and Cosmopohtan, are not
subject to prosecution in Colorado.
IV. THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION AND OBSCENITY
While basing its holding on the first amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Colorado court
in Berger made the following thought provoking statement:
In order to find that the materials are obscene as a matter of law
and capable of supporting a criminal prosecution, we must find not
only that the obscenity standards of the statute, as construed under
the First Amendment, are met, but also that there has been some
abuse of freedom of speech, as envisioned under the broader pro-
tective standard of Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado
Constitution. 64
The breadth of the Colorado Constitution's protection of free speech
can be seen in the language of article II, section 10:
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every per-
son shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any
subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in all
suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in
evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall deter-
mine the law and the fact.
65
It should be noted that the Colorado Constitution states the right in
positive terms, that "every person shall be free to speak, write, or publish
whatever he will on any subject," 66 while the United States Constitution's pro-
scription is stated in the negative, "Congress shall make no law . . "67
The Colorado Constitution speaks of liability for the abuse of freedom
of speech, but it is clear from the context that the framers saw abuse as
occurring primarily in the form of slanderous speech and libelous writings.
A credible argument can thus be advanced that obscenity is protected ex-
pression under the Colorado Constitution. Nonetheless, while the Colorado
Supreme Court has declared that the state constitution provides broader
protection to free speech than its federal counterpart, there are no Colorado
decisions in the area that significantly conflict with federal first amendment
law.
After the comment in People v. Berger, the court has never again referred
to the potential of article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution to give
broader protection to sexually explicit materials. 68 Furthermore, the chances
of the court unequivocally declaring obscenity to be protected speech are
63. 185 Colo. at 89, 521 P.2d at 1246.
64. Id at 89, 521 P.2d 1245-46.
65. CoLo. CONsT. art. II, § 10.
66. CoLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. See, e.g., People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
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remote. The justices surely recognize that such a decision would probably
be overturned by the voters either through the removal of justices from of-
fice69 or the enactment of a constitutional amendment through the referen-
dum process. 70 If courts do indeed watch the election returns, the Colorado
court must have taken notice of recent events in California, where that state
supreme court's interpretation of the California Constitution as prohibiting
the death penalty was promptly overruled by the voters.
71
V. SATISFYING THE MILLER STANDARDS
The next major case in Colorado obscenity law was People v. Tabron,72 a
1976 supreme court decision that declared the state's obscenity statute to be
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the Miller standards. The stat-
ute at issue 73 had been passed in 1971, two years before the Miller case was
decided. Therefore, this statute was drafted to comply with the then-prevail-
ing federal constitutional standards enunciated in the Memoirs case. 74 In
reviewing the conviction of a defendant who had exhibited the film "Deep
Throat" 75 in a public theater, the Colorado Supreme Court in Tabron dis-
cussed the following aspects of the Mier standards.
A. Lackig serious hterar, artistic, pohti'cal, or scientli.i value
One major change made by Miller was that obscenity was no longer
defined to be "utterly without redeeming social value," as in the Memoirs
test, but rather had to "[lack] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 76 The court in Tabron ruled that the Colorado statute's use of the
discarded Memoirs test was "[t]he most apparent defect" in its definition of
obscenity. 77 The Tabron court recognized the argument that a state should
be free to adopt the "utterly without redeeming social value" test because
that test presents a heavier burden for the state to meet than the standard
contemplated by Miller. Nevertheless, the court held that its approval of the
old standard would deprive a defendant who may have relied on the new
Miller standard of "fair warning that his action, when committed, consti-
tuted a crime." 
78
The Tabron court ignores the point that the Memoirs standard was re-
jected in Miller precisely because it placed on the prosecution "a burden
69. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
70. Id, art. XIX, § 2.
71. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. dented, 406
U.S. 988 (1972), overruled by popular enactment of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, on Nov. 7, 1972.
72. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
73. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-7-101 (1971).
74. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
75. 190 Colo. at 151, 544 P.2d at 372. Rather than trying to compel the defendant to
produce the film by means of a subpoena duces tecum, the prosecutors acquired from the Los
Angeles Police Department a videotape of "Deep Throat" that had been edited differently from
the version the defendant was showing. Id, 544 P.2d at 372-73. The court indicated in dicta
that the videotape had been admitted into evidence without a proper foundation. Id, 544 P.2d
at 373.
76. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
77. 190 Colo. at 157, 544 P.2d at 378.
78. Id. at 158, 544 P.2d at 378.
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virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof."'79
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court approved an Illinois statute that
retained "the strt~ter Memoirs formulation of the 'redeeming social value' fac-
tor." 80 Thus, states were free, despite Miller, to retain the stricter Memoirs
test to assess the societal value of obscene materials. The Colorado court in
Tabron was not justified in its concern that a defendant have notice of the
standard, because when a defendant has notice of a stricter standard, aforti-
orari he has notice of a less strict standard.
The 1981 Colorado statute does comply with the Miller standard that to
be obscene, material must "[lack] serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value."' 1 There was testimony, however, in Colorado House committee
hearings on the enacting bill that pointed up the limited usefulness of this
part of Miler test.8 2 The House State Affairs Committee heard testimony
from Reverands Moore and Mahoney, both ministers of the Church of
World Peace, that the members of their church use pornographic literature
and "obscene" devices, both proscribed by the 1981 statute, in their worship
services. According to the tenets of the Church of World Peace, "sexual en-
ergy is a profound religious force." Reverend Moore said he believed the
1981 statute discriminated against the religious practices of his church and
in favor of the Judeo-Christian moral code.
8 3
The committee members seemed somewhat nonplussed by this testi-
mony, one legislator asking if the ministers were using the term "church"
rather "loosely." ' 4 Reverend Mahoney replied that his group had been rec-
ognized as a church by the Internal Revenue Service.8 5
The above exchange may appear comical, but one serious issue raised is
whether the Miller standard might be too limited, by protecting only pruri-
ent material that has value in four disciplines: art, science, literature, and
politics. The absence of "religion" in this list may have implications arising
out of the free exercise clause of the first amendment as well as the free
speech clause.
8 6
B. Specifally Defined Conduct
The second shortcoming of the Colorado statute, according to the court
in 7abron, was its failure to comply with part (b) of the Miller standard,
which said that a statute could only prohibit depictions or descriptions of
sexual conduct that were "specifically defined by the applicable state law.
' ' a 7
The pertinent part of the Colorado statute defined an obscene work as one
79. 413 U.S. at 22.
80. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977) (emphasis added).
81. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2)(c) (Supp. 1981).
82. Colorado House State Affairs Committee Hearings on SB 38, House Committee Room F,





86. But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy not protected under
free exercise clause).
87. 413 U.S. at 24.
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that "predominantly appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism,
masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse .... 1188 The Tabron court com-
mented: "Given their plain and ordinary meaning, the words 'nudity, sex,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement . . . sadism, masochism, or sado-maso-
chistic abuse,' are not representative of the specificity contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Md/er."89
The court arrived at this conclusion by comparing the language of the
Colorado statute to the examples given in the Miller opinion of what a state
statute could define for regulation under part (b) of the standard:
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representa-
tion or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals." 9
In spite of Tabron's specific disapproval of the use of the terms "sadism"
and "masochism," the 1981 Colorado statute has again included those terms
in its definitional section. 9 1 Since the Colorado legislature has twice suffered
the embarrassment of having its obscenity enactments struck down by the
state supreme court, it is difficult to understand why the legislature has in-
cluded language in a new statute that has been specifically disapproved by
that court. Clues as to the origin of this anomaly may be seen in the legisla-
tive history of Senate Bill 38, which resulted in the current law.
92
Republican Senator Ted Strickland, the prime sponsor of Senate Bill 38
and of much of the state's obscenity legislation in recent years, assigned the
drafting of the 1981 statute to a group headed by Bob Miller, former Greeley
District Attorney and now United States Attorney for Colorado.93 Mr.
Miller apparently modeled the Colorado legislation after the Texas obscen-
ity statute,94 the constitutionality of which he said had been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Cg'stal Theaters v. Wade. 95 The case Mr.
Miller referred to, however, was a memorandum decision involving a denial
of stay, not a decision on the merits of the Texas statute. Indeed, at the time
of the committee hearings, the only federal authorities upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Texas statute were the memorandum decisions of two fed-
eral district courts that were affirmed in part by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance96 on June 23, 1981, after the Colo-
rado statute had been passed. The Red Bluff decision upheld the inclusion of
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-7-101(1) (1971).
89. 190 Colo. at 159, 544 P.2d at 379.
90. 413 U.S. at 25.
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2)(b)(II) (Supp. 1981).
92. 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 998.
93. Colorado Senate Affais Comm. Hearings on S 38, Senate Committee Room 320 E, Feb. 24,
1981, 9:18 to 10:37 A.M. (available at the state archives on tape) (hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
94. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21 to -.23 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982).
95. 444 U.S. 959 (1979) (mem).
96. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982). There was brief
mention of the Texas statute in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per
curiam), a case invalidating the use of Texas injunctive procedures to prevent the future show-
ing of allegedly obscene motion pictures. Justice White remarked in a footnote to his dissenting
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"sadism" and "masochism" in the definitional parts of the statute, but found
several other portions of the Texas statutory scheme "questionable," and in-
voked the abstention doctrine to await state court decisions that might con-
stitutionally construe those provisions.
9 7
In upholding the inclusion of "sadism" and "masochism," 9 8 the Red
Bluff court relied on the 1977 Supreme Court decision of Ward v. Illinois.99
Ironically, the Supreme Court in Ward upheld10 0 the constitutionality of an
Illinois obscenity statute that had wording nearly identical to that of the
Colorado statute struck down in Tabron; the statute was approved primarily
because the supreme court of Illinois had construed the statute in such a way
as to comply with Miller.' 0 '
The defendant in Ward asserted that sado-masochistic materials could
not be constitutionally proscribed because they were not expressly included
within the examples Md/er gave to explain part (b) of its standard. 10 2 Jus-
tice White, writing for the Court, replied, "but those specifics were offered
merely as 'examples'. . . and. . . 'were not intended to be exhaustive.' "103
Justice White went on to say, "[t]here was no suggestion in Miller that we
intended to extend constitutional protection to the kind of flagellatory
materials that were among those held obscene in Misihkin v. New York
"104
The Colorado trial court relied on Ward v. llinois in upholding the
terms "sadism" and "masochism" as used in the 1981 statute. 10 5 But the
Colorado Supreme Court may adopt the reasoning of Justice Stevens, who
dissented in Ward v. Illinois because he believed the Ward majority improp-
erly loosened the tight reins of specificity with which Miller had harnessed
state obscenity regulation.' 6 Of course, the potential constitutional infir-
mity in the 1981 statute could have been avoided if the drafters had ade-
quately considered Colorado case law rather than relying solely on the Texas
statute as their blueprint.
C. Community Standards
One of the major changes in the law of obscenity made by the Burger
Court in Miler was the abandonment of the holding injacobelh' v. Ohio 1
0 7
that the community standard must be national in scope.' 0 8 The first prong
of the Mdler guidelines states that whether material is obscene must be judg-
opinion, "[s]ection 43.21, in turn, tracks nearly verbatim the Miller guidelines." 445 U.S. at 321
n.l.
97. 648 F.2d at 1027-36.
98. Id at 1027.
99.. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
100. Id at 770.
101. Id at 775.
102. Id. at 773.
103. Id (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974)).
104. Id. (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 505-10 (1966)).
105. People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., No. 81CV5779 (Denver Dist. Court,
Mar. 15, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo. Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982).
106. 431 U.S. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
108. Id at 195.
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ed with reference to "'the average person applying contemporary commu-
nity standards.' "109 The Court thus stated:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Missis-
sippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City. . . .People in different States vary in
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled
by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. 10
In People v. Tabron,1 ' the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the Miller
decision had not given much guidance as to what the boundaries should be
for the localized community standard. " 2 In the companion case to Tabron,
People v. Tabron (II) "', the Colorado Supreme Court decided that a state-
wide community standard was required.
It is fundamentally unfair that any person would be called
upon to undergo a trial that would entail criminal penalties for the
violation of a state obscenity statute without knowing what the
standard is that will determine his guilt or innocence. The random
decision of a judge or jury cannot be the standard, and the state
statute should not be construed in a different manner in Denver,
Littleton, Grand Junction, Colorado Springs, and Aspen. 1
4
The court in Tabron II seemed to be concerned about equal protection
of the law for defendants and uniformity of interpretation for courts. The
Colorado Supreme Court's agreement with the Miller opinion that "a na-
tional standard would be an exercise in futility,"' 15 however, is itself an exer-
cise in self-delusion. A statewide standard for Colorado is necessarily an
amalgam of the attitudes toward obscenity ranging from Boulder college stu-
dents and the Capitol Hill denizens to the possibly more conservative citi-
zens of rural areas and the suburbs. Thus, Colorado's spectrum of views on
the subject of obscenity is to some extent a microcosm of the nation's views
as a whole. The true "exercise in futility" may ultimately be the Burger
Court's irrational replacement of a hypothetical, abstract nationwide stan-
dard with a local standard that most of the states are interpreting to be an
equally hypothetical, abstract statewide standard.' 16
D. The Objectionable Work Taken as a Whole
Both prongs (a) and (c) of the three prong Miller standards' 17 empha-
sized that an objectionable work must be considered in its entirety in making
109. 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.. 229, 230 (1972)).
110. 413 U.S. at 32-33 (citations omitted).
Ill. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
112. Id at 157, 544 P.2d at 377.
113. 190 Colo. 161, 544 P.2d 380 (1976). abron and Tabron I1 involved prosecution of the
same defendant; however, in the second case the issue was defendant's exhibition of the film
"Behind the Green Door."
114. Id at 162-63, 544 P.2d at 381.
115. Id at 162, 544 P.2d at 381.
116. The Colorado court noted in Tabron II that it was joining a number of other state
courts that had adopted statewide community standards. Id at 163, 544 P.2d at 381.
117. 413 U.S. at 24. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the determination of whether it is obscene. This principle was first promul-
gated in 1957 in the fountainhead case of Roth v. United States. 1'8 Roth re-
jected the common-law view, which had developed from the 19th century
English case of Regina v. Hic/ihn," 9 that a work could be judged obscene
based on an examination of isolated passages and the effect those passages
might have on a particularly susceptible reader.' 20 Roth found that such a
test might encroach on first amendment freedoms by encompassing materi-
als that, taken as a whole, deal with sex in a legitimate manner. 12 1
In People v. New Horizons, Inc. 122 the Colorado Supreme Court struck
down the 1977 Colorado obscenity statute for violating the Miller require-
ment that obscenity be determined by considering objectionable material in
its entirety. Although the statute included the "taken as a whole" language
in two appropriate places in the definition of "obscene material, '"123 the
Achilles heel of the statute was in its definition of "material": " 'Material'
means any physical object, facsimile, recording, transcription, pictorial rep-
resentation, motion picture, or reproduction . . . but does not include the printed
or written word." 1
24
The court reasoned that since "material" did not include the printed
word, a jury examining a book or magazine with both pictures and text
could consider only the pictures as being potentially obscene.' 25 Thus, "the
pictures could be declared obscene and the entire magazine banned under
the statute without reference to whether the included text or other articles
imbued the magazine with serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."1
26
The court in New Horizons recognized that this provision was designed
to protect free speech by immunizing unillustrated literature from censor-
ship. The court, however, declined to construe the statute so as to give effect
to the legislative intent.
t 27
The legislative history behind this particular blunder reveals the diffi-
culty in passing constitutional obscenity legislation. In 1976, the legislature
was faced with the task of drafting a new obscenity statute in the wake of the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision in People v. Tabron. '2 8 There was still a
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives as a consequence of
the Watergate landslide in 1974. The voices of moderation prevailed, result-
ing in an obscenity statute that outlawed the promotion of all hard-core por-
nography to children and yet outlawed only live sex performances and
sadomasochistic materials with respect to adults.' 29 The 1976 statute also
118. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
119. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), ctedin Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
120. 354 U.S. at 489.
121. Id.
122. 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980).
123. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(i)(b) (Supp. 1981).
124. Id. at § 18-7-101(5) (emphasis added).
125. 616 P.2d at 110.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
129. 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 555.
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contained a provision exempting the printed or written word from its defini-
tion of "material." 
1 3 0
The 1976 statute was never litigated at the appellate level, because the
Republicans regained control of the legislature during the 1977 session. As a
result, the 1976 statute was repealed in favor of a more restrictive law that
outlawed the promotion of a broader range of obscene materials to adults. 13
Unlike the 1976 bill, the original version of the 1977 bill did not contain the
exemption for the written or printed word, 132 but Democratic Representa-
tive Wayne Knox added the exemption as an amendment in the House.'
33
The Senate did not concur in the House amendments and a conference com-
mittee was appointed. The majority report recommended that the House
withdraw the Knox amendment,' a3 while the minority report, authored by
Senator Ted Strickland and Representative Ken Kramer, recommended
that the Senate accept the Knox amendment.' 35  The House eventually
adopted the minority report of the conference committee, repassed the
bill,' 3 6 and the Senate conceded to this decision. 137
Thus, through the process of compromise and consensus, an element
was introduced into the bill that conflicted with the original purpose of the
redrafting process, which was to create an obscenity statute in compliance
with the Md/er standards.
E. Material Must Be Patently Ofensi'e
Included in both part (b) of the Miller test and in the Miller "examples"
for part (b) is the concept that material must be "patently offensive" to be
obscene.' 38 The 1981 Colorado obscenity statute, modelled after the Texas
obscenity law, defines "patently offensive" as "so offensive on its face as to
affront current community standards of decency."'
39
130. Id at 556. According to Rep. Wayne Knox, it was Republican Don Friedman who
originally suggested this provision be included, upon the recommendation of booksellers. Inter-
view with Wayne Knox, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
131. 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 982. The sponsors of the 1977 bill were, itter alia, Sens. Ted
Strickland and Arch Decker (then a Democrat, and Republican candidate for Congress in the
first Congressional district in 1982); Reps. Sam Zakhem and Ken Kramer (now U.S. Congress-
man, fifth district). -According to Rep. Wayne Knox, the crusade to pass a tougher law may
have been in part sparked by a comment purportedly made by Art Schwartz, a noted defense
attorney in the field of obscenity law, that the 1976 law "legalized pornography." Interview
with Wayne Know, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
132. S. 447, 51st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977).
133. 1977 Colo. H.J. 1296, amend. 3.
134. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2020.
135. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2081-82.
136. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2090-91. Rep. Knox voted against the bill despite the acceptance of
his amendment. Id He said in an interview that he felt there were other constitutional
problems with the bill, and that the Colorado Supreme Court had just decided to focus on that
particular defect. Knox also criticized Sen. Strickland for getting obscenity legislation assigned
to the state affairs committee instead of the judiciary committee, where, according to Knox, a
more competent analysis of the constitutional ramifications of bills could be made. Interview
with Wayne Knox, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
137. 1977 Colo. Sen. J. 2250.
138. 413 U.S. at 24-25.
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(4) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.21 (a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the constitutionality of
the Texas law in Red Bluff Drive-ln, Inc. v. Vance, 1 4 0 found this definition to be
questionable because of language in Mller and another Supreme Court case,
Smith v. United States. 14 ' The court in Red Bluff indicated that obscenity
should be judged with reference to the community's standards of tolerance
rather than the community's standards of decency.' 42 The Fifth Circuit com-
mented that "the line between protected expression and punishable obscen-
ity must be drawn at the limits of a community's tolerance rather than in
accordance with the dangerous standards of propriety and taste."1
43
The Fifth Circuit decided to abstain from declaring the Texas statute
unconstitutional in order to give state courts the opportunity to interpret the
offending language in a manner consistent with constitutional standards. 144
The distinction drawn by the Fifth Circuit, however, may not rise to consti-
tutional significance because that court overlooked the fact that a jury in-
struction approved in the Miller case referred to community standards of
"decency," though the constitutional ramifications of that term were not in-
cluded in the Miller Court's discussion of the instruction.
145
F. Obscenity in the Context of Verbal Assault
In the Colorado case of People '. Weeks 146 a defendant was charged with
violating the state telephone harassment statute' 4 7 by making obscene tele-
phone calls. "48 The trial court dismissed the charges, accepting defendant's
argument, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to de-
fendant because it did not comply with the Miller standards in its definition
of "obscene." ' 149 The Colorado Supreme Court ordered the charges rein-
stated, finding that the requirements of Miller "are inapposite when the
question is whether the state may prohibit unwanted verbal assaults on a
person within the privacy of his own home."' 50 The court pointed out that
the gravamen of the offense was not the content of the speech, as it would be
in an ordinary obscenity prosecution, but rather the manner in which the
message was delivered-"the thrusting of an offensive and unwanted com-
munication on one who is unable to ignore it.'
5 1
VI. THE BROAD DOCTRINES: STANDING, OVERBREADTH, VAGUENESS,
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In the preceding section there was a discussion of the Miller guidelines,
which are specific to obscenity law. But broader doctrines of first amend-
140. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982).
141. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
142. 648 F.2d at 1028-29 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977)).
143. 648 F.2d at 1029.
144. Id
145. 413 U.S. at 31.
146. 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
147. CoLw. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111(1)(e) (1976).
148. 197 Colo. at 177, 591 P.2d at 93.
149. Id at 180, 591 P.2d at 95.
150. Id
151. Id at 182, 591 P.2d at 96.
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ment jurisprudence and constitutional law in general, such as standing, over-
breadth, vagueness, and equal protection, can also have an impact on the
consideration of the constitutionality of obscenity statutes.
A. Standing
In Colorado obscenity cases, the standing doctrine has been invoked
when a defendant asserts that a statute is overbroad. 152 The general princi-
ple of standing is that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally
applied cannot challenge that statute on the ground that it could be uncon-
stitutionally applied to others in situations not before the court.' 53 An ex-
ception to this rule, however, is the situation in which a litigant claims that a
statute regulating speech is overbroad because it infringes on protected areas
of speech as well as prohibits that which it can legitimately prohibit. 154 In
those cases, a litigant whose conduct might be prohibited under a more nar-
rowly drawn statute is allowed to challenge the overbroad statute under the
assumption that the existence of the statute might "chill" the exercise of
those legitimate activities that the statute encompasses.' 5 5 Under this ra-
tionale the defendant in People v. Tabron, t 56 who had exhibited "Deep
Throat," a film that probably could have been legitimately banned by a
correctly drawn statute, was given standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the statute.'
57
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case, Marco Lounge, Inc. o. City of Fed-
eral Heights,' 58 elucidates the court's view of the standing principle. The
Marco case was unique for several reasons: it was the first time the supreme
court decided a case in which the issue was the use of zoning legislation to
control obscenity; it was the first time a justice other than William Erickson
wrote an opinion in the area; ' 59 and, it was the first time the obscenity issue
split the court. 16°
The case involved a bar with live, nude dancers in Federal Heights.161
The music stopped when the town board of trustees adopted a zoning ordi-
nance that relegated all nude entertainment, pornography shops, and mas-
sage parlors to "E- 1 Entertainment" districts.162 The catch was that no such
districts existed, and they could only be created by the voters through the
initiative process.' 63 With respect to Marco's case, the most significant provi-
sion of the ordinance declared: "Nothing herein shall apply to premises 1i-
152. E.g., People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
153. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
154. Id. at 611-12.
155. Id at 612.
156. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
157. Id at 152, 544 P.2d at 373.
158. 625 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1981).
159. Justice Lohr authored the majority opinion.
160. Justices Erickson, Dubofsky, and Quinn joined in the majority opinion, while the Jus-
tices who are generally regarded as more conservative, Lee, Rovira, and Chief Justice Hodges,
dissented.





censed under the State Liquor Code, except that live, nude entertainment
shall be prohibited in all such premises."' 64 Neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinion seemed to appreciate the effect of this provision on the
legal theory of the Marco case.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Marco agreed that the
state, pursuant to the powers granted by the twenty-first amendment, may
constitutionally prohibit live, nude entertainment in establishments operat-
ing with a state liquor license. 16 5 Both opinions cite the United States
Supreme Court decision in Cahfiorn'a v. LaRue '16 6 as authority for that
proposition.
Inexplicably, the dissenting justices stated there was no standing based
on the failure of the Marco Lounge to seek enactment of an E-1 entertain-
ment district by initiative before attempting to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance.' 6 7 Justice Rovira stated in his dissent:
At such time as Marco has attempted to establish an E- I En-
tertainment District and the qualified electors of Federal Heights
have defeated such a proposal, then it would be in a position to
complain of a denial of freedom of speech, and it would have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance. '
68
Why would Marco Lounge initiate a proposal to create an E- 1 en-
tertainment district, unless it planned on serving sarsaparilla instead of li-
quor? The justices seemed to forget that since the Marco Lounge had a
liquor license it was specifically exempted from the zoning provisions of the
ordinance and absolutely prohibited from providing nude entertainment. 1
69
Thus, in granting standing to Marco Lounge under the loosened stand-
ing rules for claims of overbreadth, the majority contradicted the stance the
court had taken two years earlier in People v. Weeks. 170 In Weeks the court
denied an obscene caller standing to attack the telephone harassment statute
under the following rationale:
[Ulse of the [overbreadth] doctrine is reserved for those defendants
whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is
designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to
the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a
type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute
as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconsti-
tutional as applied to them.' 7 '
Justice Lohr, in a footnote to his majority opinion in Marco, questioned
whether the above statement was consistent with the overbreadth standing
164. Id (quoting FEDERAL HEIGHTS, COLO. Ordinance § 10-1-5A.4 (Aug. 28, 1976)).
165. 625 P.2d at 986, 989.
166. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). The LaRue holding was later solidified in a post-Marco case, New
York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
167. 625 P.2d at 991 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
168. Id
169. FEDERAL HEIGHTS, COLO. Ordinance § 10-1-5A.4 (Aug. 28, 1976).
170. 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
171. Id at 179, 591 P.2d at 94.
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doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. 172 Indeed, Jus-
tice Erickson, in writing the above passage from Weeks, cited Broadrick v.
Oklahoma 7 3 and a Colorado case, Bolles v. People,' 74 neither of which sup-
ports the Weeks proposition.
Aside from the faulty Weeks precedent and the failure of the Mlarco court
to apply the appropriate portion of the Federal Heights ordinance, the
standing issue in Marco came down to the applicability of the following state-
ment from Broadrick v. Oklahoma: "[P]articularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."' 75 Because Marco's conduct was plainly and le-
gitimately proscribed by the statute, the question of his standing would de-
pend on whether the statute was substantially overbroad. 1
76
B. Overbreadth
1. Zoning Ordinances: Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights
The majority opinion in Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights was
correct in finding the zoning ordinances at issue in that case substantially
overbroad. For there to be an overbreadth problem, the statute must first be
found to encompass protected conduct.' 77 The Marco majority pointed out
that certain forms of live, nude entertainment are protected expression
under the first amendment,""8 citing, inter aia, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 179 The
United States Supreme Court in Doran gave "Ballet Africains" as an exam-
ple of protected nude entertainment. 80
The zoning ordinance of Federal Heights constituted a blanket prohibi-
tion of these protected forms of expression; nude dancing was allowed only
in non-existent E-1 districts. The city and the dissenters suggested that the
provisions for initiated elections to establish E-1 districts rescued the ordi-
nance from facial invalidity. The majority rejected this contention pointing
out that such "place" restrictions had only been upheld when the issuance of
licenses or permits for the protected activity was governed by definite stan-
dards and the decision was subject to judicial review.'8 1 The majority
stated:
Putting aside the question whether the time and expense incident
to such a procedure would in themselves unconstitutionally burden
exercise of First Amendment rights, see Bay sde Enterprises, Inc. v. Car-
son, . . . we hold that Marco's right to challenge the zoning plan
cannot be conditioned on lack of success in a standardless, unre-
172. 625 P.2d at 986 n.5.
173. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
174. 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975).
175. 413 U.S. at 615.
176. See itfra text accompanying notes 178-216.
177. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
178. 625 P.2d at 985.
179. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
180. Id. at 933.






The majority opinion is persuasive as far as it goes. The central ques-
tion, however, was not fully addressed. It is absurd to suggest that a regula-
tory scheme is valid which requires an individual to submit his right to
engage in constitutionally protected expression to a popular election. As the
majority in Marco pointed out, the possibility of censorship by a majority
vote was the essential reason for enshrining the right of free expression in the
Constitution. 183
2. Obscenity Must Be Erotic: People v. Tabron
Some of the weakest overbreadth analysis in Colorado case law can be
found in People v. Tabron. 184 The court faulted the Colorado obscenity stat-
ute not only because it failed to comply with the Miller standards, but also
because it was "drawn overly broad" in its inclusion of "activities which
could be described or depicted in some context other than an erotic one."'
185
One of the Colorado court's authorities for the proposition that obscenity
must be erotic was Erznoznzk v. City ofJacksonville. 8 6 In Erznoznzk, the United
States Supreme Court declared a municipal ordinance unconstitutional that
banned nudity on drive-in movie screens that were visible outside the movie
premises from a public place. The Supreme Court stated that despite the
aim of protecting children, the drive-in ordinance was overly broad because
it was not limited to sexually explicit nudity, but would encompass non-
erotic nudity such as the naked body of a war victim in a documentary
film.
187
In reaching its conclusion that the Colorado statute regulated non-
erotic material, the Colorado court was taking the word "nudity" in the stat-
ute's definition of "obscene" out of context. The statute defined as "ob-
scene" that which "predominately appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or
morbid interest in nudity .. ."i88 It is difficult to understand how nudity
appealing to lustful interests could be depicted in a non-erotic context.' 89
3. Impingement on Privacy Interests: The 1981 Colorado Statute
The 1981 Colorado obscenity statute prohibits the "promotion" of "ob-
scene devices" as well as obscene publications. 190 An obscene device is de-
fined as "a device including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital or-
182. 625 P.2d at 988-89 (citing Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D.
Fla. 1978)).
183. 625 P.2d at 988.
184. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
185. Id. at 159, 544 P.2d at 379.
186. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
187. Id. at 213.
188. CoLt). REV. STAT. § 40-7-101(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
189. Yet Justice Erickson so prefers this analysis that he once again employed it in a com-
panion case to Tabron, Menefee v. Denver, 190 Colo. 163, 166, 544 P.2d 382, 383 (1976), which
declared the Denver municipal obscenity ordinance unconstitutional.
190. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(2)(a)(I) (Supp. 1981).
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gans.' ' 9 1 To promote an obscene device is to "manufacture, issue, sell, give,
provide, lend, mail, deliver .. .or to oer or agree to do the same.' 92
The Fifth Circuit, interpreting the Texas progenitor of Colorado's stat-
ute in Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance,193 found that the above sections, taken
together, appeared overly broad because they swept within their ambit "acts
the state cannot criminalize."' 94 The Fifth Circuit stated:
The literal language of the statute forbids the most sensitive and
intimate conversations. For example, a husband could be found to
have violated the letter of the statute by uttering in the privacy of
the marital bedroom a verbal suggestion to procure for his wife one
of the commercially available small appliances referred to as
vibrators.195 (Footnote omitted).
The court recognized that this kind of prohibition was inconsistent with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Georgia,196 which held
that statutes regulating obscenity could not reach into the privacy of the
home. The Fifth Circuit in Red Bluff, however, abstained from declaring the
Texas statute unconstitutional. Instead, the court decided to await a nar-
rowing construction by state courts.1
9 7
Representative Chris Paulson, a member of the Colorado House of Rep-
resentatives, expressed concern about the privacy aspects of the Colorado
statute in the 1981 House hearings on Senate Bill 38.198 Paulson later of-
fered the following amendment to the bill,' 99 which was accepted and incor-
porated into the statute: "This section does not apply to a person's conduct
otherwise prescribed [sic] by this section which occurs in that person's resi-
dence as long as that person does not engage in the wholesale promotion or
promotion of obscene material in his residence."
'20 0
This amendment is an exercise in tautology and to paraphrase, the
amendment says: This section does not apply to conduct in your residence
as long as you do not engage in the conduct prohibited by this section in
your residence. In essence, the section begs the question with respect to the
overbreadth of the term "promote," except that it appears to give a blanket
exemption for use of obscene desires in the residence.
4. Infringement on Protected Adult Activity: The 1981 "Display"
Statute
The obscenity statute modelled after Texas law was not the only legisla-
tive activity in this area during the 1981 session. The legislature also suc-
191. Id. at § 18-7-101(3).
192. Id. at 18-7-101(6) (emphasis added).
193. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982).
194. Id. at 1029.
195. Id. at 1029-30.
196. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
197. 648 F.2d at 1030. See also People v. Mizell, No. 82CR1053 (Dist. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Oct.
21, 1982) ("promote" found overbroad).
198. House Hearings, supra note 82.
199. 1981 Colo. H.J. 1235.
200. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(6) (Supp. 1981).
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ceeded in enacting a statute to limit childrens' access to obscene material. 2 0
The most controversial portion of the statute prohibits the display of
sexually explicit materials that are "harmful to children" at "news stands or
any other business or commercial establishment frequented by children or
where children are or may be invited as part of the general public. ' 20 2 The
statute defines "harmful to children" as pertaining to those materials that
appeal to the "prurient interest in sex of children," that are patently offen-
sive to prevailing standards in the adult community as to what is sutablefor
children, and that are "lacking in serious literary, artistic, political, and scien-
tific valuefor children."
20 3
The legislature had attempted to pass similar legislation during the
1978 session, only to have it vetoed by Governor Richard Lamm.20 4 In con-
junction with his veto, the Governor initiated a voluntary agreement with
major vendors of adult magazines to have their distribution outlets keep
such magazines behind the counter or otherwise out of the reach of chil-
dren. 20 5 The Governor also vetoed the 1981 statute, but this time the legis-
lature overrode the veto by large margins.
20 6
According to the Governor's veto message, he was advised by the Attor-
ney General to disapprove the bill because it was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. 20 7 The Governor stated that the legislation would "impinge
upon and jeopardize the business of quality bookstores, galleries, and even
grocery stores which might have one questionable book or magazine among
its multitude of other goods and merchandise.
'20 8
The Governor's point has merit. It is common knowledge that many
paperback books and magazines sold in grocery stores, drug stores, and at
assorted other locations contain sexual descriptions that many adults would
not find suitable for children. Under this statute, such establishments would
have to prohibit children from coming in at all or, at a minimum, would
have to physically segregate the book and magazine section from the rest of
the store, and not allow children to enter this section.
20 9
In a lawsuit brought by booksellers to enjoin enforcement of the statute,
the Denver district court severed the "display" section from the statute, find-
ing that it was unduly burdensome on booksellers and "chilling" to the
"channels of dissemination."'2 10 In preparing their case for the Colorado
Supreme Court, the booksellers can take comfort from the indications in
Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights that a majority of the justices on
201. Cou). REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-501 to -504 (Supp. 1981).
202. Id at § 18-7-502(5).
203. Id at § 18-7-501(2) (emphasis added).
204. Message from the Governor, 1981 Colo. H.J. 2263.
205. Id
206. The Senate vote was 27-8 in favor of overriding Governor Lamm's veto of H.B. 1310,
1981 Colo. Sen. J. 2597. The House vote was 47-15 in favor of overriding. 1981 Colo. H.J.
2328.
207. Message from the Governor, 1981 Colo. H.J. 2263.
208. Id
209. See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, No. 8 ICV09693, slip op. at 4 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan.
26, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1982).
210. Id. at 5.
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the supreme court look unfavorably on regulatory schemes that are exces-
sively burdensome on first amendment rights.
2 1 '
The Colorado district court, however, upheld the part of the statute
prohibiting the sale of sexually explicit materials to minors,212 relying on
Ginsberg v. New York. 2 13 Ginsberg was a United States Supreme Court case
holding that states have the power to control the dissemination of certain
material to minors even though that same material might involve protected
expression if distributed to adults.2 14 Also left intact by the Colorado district
court was a controversial portion of the statute that prohibits the admission
of children to sexually explicit movies without reference to whether they are
accompanied by a parent.
2 1 5
C. Vagueness
The critical vulnerability of the 1981 obscenity statute appears to be a
section that exempts from prosecution "any accrediled theater, museum, li-
brary, school, or institution of higher education."2 " Examining the term
"accredited" in the case of People v. Seven Thiry-fve East Co/fax, Inc. ,2 1 7 the
Denver district court said: "Although this term is frequently mentioned in
conjunction with 'schools' it is not a common, or even appropriate term in
connection with museums, libraries and theaters. '2 - 8 The court found the
term unconstitutionally vague, 2t 9 as did the district court judge considering
a parallel provision in the "display" statute in Talered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley.
220
The "accredited" section in the obscenity statute was not in the original
bill, but rather, was introduced into the bill by an amendment reminiscent
of the fatal defect in the 1979 legislation. Senator Ted Strickland, who of-
fered the amendment, 22 said in an interview that the amendment was of-
fered to protect legitimate concerns and thereby gain uniform support for
the bill in the general assembly.
222
The discussion of this section that took place during the House hearings
casts some light on the underlying rationale or lack thereof.22 " Republican
Representative James Lee, an attorney, asked Bob Miller, a proponent of the
211. 625 P.2d at 988.
212. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, No. 81CV09693, slip op. at 4 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,
1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar 23, 1982).
213. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
214. Id at 637-39.
215. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-502(2) (Supp. 1981).
216. Id. at § 18-7-104(1)(b) (emphasis added).
217. No. 81CV5779 (Denver Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo.
Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982). See also People v. Mizell, No. 82CR1053 (Dist. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Oct.
21, 1982) ("accredited" section struck down as denial of equal protection).
218. Id at 5.
219. Id at 6.
220. No. 81CV90693, slip op. at 6 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1982).
221. 1981 Colo. Sen. J. 629.
222. Interview with Ted Strickland, State Senator, (Apr. 23, 1982). A legislative drafting
office file on the 1977 statute reveals that the word "bona fide" was also considered for use in
this type of provision. Sen. Strickland also commented that one substitute for the offending
term that was considered, but rejected, was "legitimate."
223. See House Hearings, supra note 82.
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bill, "[wihat's the definition of an 'accredited theater?' ",224 Miller replied
that he did not know.
2 25
Senator Strickland spoke up: "That word was carefully chosen because
of the reference to institutions of higher education . . . an accredited theater
is part of that institution.
2 26
"You're not talking about commercial theaters?" asked Representative
Lee.
227
"No," Senator Strickland replied.
22 8
What is remarkable about this dialogue is that it occurred, and yet no
one attempted to resolve the ambiguity in the bill.
D. Equal Protection of the Law.- The Handicapped and the Prohibition of Obscene
Devices
In the case challenging the parallel Texas obscenity statute, one of the
plaintiffs, a paraplegic, raised an equal protection claim against the statute's
proscription of obscene devices. 229 This plaintiff argued that enforcement of
the statute would deny him the constitutional right to a normal sex life.
2 30
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument with the comment that no such
constitutional right has been recognized.
23'
The 1981 Colorado statute defines obscene devices as devices "designed
or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital or-
gans."2 32 This language is broad enough, however, to include prosthetic im-
plants and electrode devices designed to aid impotent men. The right of
those handicapped by impotence to use such devices, and the concomitant
right of persons to sell such devices, should be recognized on the basis of the
privacy right enunciated in Griswoldv. Connecticut2 33 and the right of personal
autonomy recognized in Roe v. Wade.
234
VII. OBSCENITY LAW AND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE LEVELS
AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
A. Levels
1. Federal-State: The Abstention Doctrine






229. Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 198 1),cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1264 (1982).
230. Id
231. Id.
232. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-101(3) (Supp. 1981)..
233. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (there is a privacy right in connection with birth control devices).
234. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (struck down an abortion law for infringing on the constitutional
right of personal autonomy).
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jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state action if the resolution of
state law questions by the state courts might make the federal constitutional
questions moot. 23 5 It is not surprising that in the one federal court encoun-
ter with the thorny problem of the constitutionality of a Colorado obscenity
statute, this doctrine was invoked. In Bergstrom v. Rickells,236 an inmate of
the Colorado State Penitentiary brought an action alleging that the mail
room officer of the penitentiary had failed to deliver him certain books on
the grounds that they were obscene. 23 7 The Board of Corrections had
adopted a regulation, pursuant to the 1979 obscenity statute, which banned
"obscenity contraband," and the prisoner contended the regulation was in-
valid. 2:38 The district court abstained from deciding the constitutionality of
the statute. "[W]hen the state court's interpretation of the statute or evalua-
tion of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to con-
sider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should
hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily. 2 39
2. State-City: Preemption
Pierce v. Ciy and County of Denver240 involved a suit brought by the man-
ager of a university bookstore against the city to enjoin enforcement of an
obscenity ordinance.2 4 1 The city council had moved quickly to adopt a new
ordinance in the wake of the invalidation of its previous ordinance in Menefee
v. City and County of Denver.2 4 2 The Colorado Supreme Court in Pierce held
that the court's adoption of statewide community standards in Tabron II ren-
dered the regulation of obscenity a matter of statewide concern under the
Colorado Constitution. 243 Therefore, the city ordinance was invalid because
it exceeded the state legislative grant of power.
244
B. Branches.- Legislative-Judzal
The judiciary in Colorado has not been inclined to assist the legislature
by construing obscenity statutes so as to bring them into compliance with
constitutional guidelines; instead the courts have completely invalidated
these statutes, forcing the legislature "back to the drawing board."
1. Original Proceeding
One avenue open to the legislature for expediting the "trial-and-error"
process that has developed in obscenity legislation is the "original proceed-
235. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
236. 495 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1980).
237. Id at 210. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asserted that
the refusal to deliver the books he purchased violated his first amendment rights.
238. Id. at 211.
239. 495 F. Supp. at 212 (quoting City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tele. & Tele. Co., 358
U.S. 639, 641 (1959)).
240. 193 Colo. 347, 565 P.2d 1337 (1977).
241. Id. at 348, 565 P.2d at 1337-38.
242. 190 Colo. 163, 544 P.2d 382 (1976). This was a companion case to People v. Tabron,
190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
243. See 193 Colo. at 349, 565 P.2d at 1339; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
244. 193 Colo. at 350-51, 565 P.2d at 1339-40.
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ing." The Colorado Constitution provides: "The supreme court shall give
its opinion upon important questions upon solemn occasions when required
by the governor, the senate, or the house of representatives; and all such
opinions shall be published in connection with the reported decision of said
court."
2 4 5
Despite the seemingly mandatory nature of this language, the supreme
court has generally resisted giving guidance to the legislature on the grounds
that such decisions must be made in the context of a concrete controversy.
2 46
While formal interrogatories have never been submitted on an obscenity
statute, an informed source in the legislature imparted the information that
a senior senator of the majority party approached Chief Justice Hodges on
the subject informally and has not received an encouraging response.
2 47
2. Authoritative Construction
In promulgating new guidelines for state obscenity regulation, the
United States Supreme Court was careful to say in Mier v. California,248 that
states did not have to meet the guidelines by passing new obscenity stat-
utes.249 Instead, an authoritative construction could be placed on existing
state statutes by state courts thereby incorporating the Miller standards.
250
A number of state courts accepted this suggestion.
2 5 1
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, did not. In People v. Tabron, the
court stated: "What the prosecution urges, under the guise of 'authoritative
construction,' is a 'wholesale rewriting' of the Colorado Obscenity Stat-
utes." 252 The court indicated that such wholesale rewriting would amount
to a judicial usurpation of legislative power and thus, a violation of the doc-
trine of separation of powers.2
53
But in People v. New Horzons, Inc. ,254 the case involving the 1979 statute
and its exemption for the printed word, the court did not have the excuse
that authoritative construction of the statute would involve wholesale rewrit-
ing. The court could have easily construed the offending provision in ac-
cordance with the legislative intent that publications could not be declared
obscene on the basis of the printed word alone. The court, however, avoided
the issue of construction by declaring "we are bound by the clear language
of the statute and must declare it unconstitutional. '25 5 The stance of the
Colorado court seems inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's
245. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
246. See In Re Interrogatories Propounded By the Senate, 131 Colo. 389, 291 P.2d 1013
(1955).
247. The source asked that neither he nor the senior senator be identified. See Note, Constitu-
tiona/ih of Obscenity Statutes: People v. New Horizons, 52 CoLO. U.L. REV. 575, 580 (1981).
248. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6.
249. Id
250. Id.
251. Note, Constitutionah"o ofObscenio Statutes: People v. New Horizons, 52 CoLO. U.L. REV.
575, 582 n.44 (1981).
252. 190 Colo. 149, 160, 544 P.2d 372, 379 (1976).
253. Id (quoting Art Theater Guilde, Inc. v. State ex. rel. Rhodes, 510 S.W. 2d 258 (Tenn.
1974)).
254. 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980).
255. 616 P.2d at 110.
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view as expressed in Broadrick v. Oklahoma .256 According to Broadrick, the
striking down of an entire statute under the overbreadth doctrine is a rem-
edy that should be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and instead a
"limiting construction" should be employed whenever possible.
25 7
3. Severability
Having abandoned any hope of getting the supreme court to authorita-
tively construe its enactments, legislators have sought salvation in the con-
cept of severability. Senator Strickland expressed his disappointment that
the supreme court had failed to sever the offending language in the 1979
statute that exempted the printed word.2 58 Strickland emphasized that in
the 1981 statute the draftsmen had included two severability clauses, one at
the end of the definitional section 259 and one at the end of the entire
statute.
260
Senator Strickland's remarks expose a basic misunderstanding of the
canons of statutory interpretation. It is a well-established principle that pe-
nal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of those whose interests they
adversely affect, 26 ' and that courts cannot construe a statute in a manner
that will criminalize conduct that was previously not criminal. 262 It would
have been inconsistent with these principles for the supreme court in New
Horizons to strike from the 1979 statute the offending language exempting
the printed word and thereby create a new class which would be subject to
penal sanctions-the purveyors of exclusively narrative pornography.
Senator Strickland is not the only person who failed to recognize these
principles. In Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 2 6 3 the district court judge solved
the vagueness problem involving the language "accredited theater" in the
"display" statute264 by striking the entire exemption for accredited institu-
tions. 265 Thus, the court extended the reach of the statute. Theoretically,
the revised statute would be violated when a college bookstore manager sells
a book that depicts sexual matters unsuitable for children to a seventeen-
year-old freshman.
The district court judge examining the 1981 obscenity statute has ap-
parently arrived at a more reasonable construction by striking only the word
"accredited" 266 from the exemption provision. If this construction is upheld
on appeal, the severability clause will not have solved the legislature's prob-
256. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
257. Id at 613.
258. House Hearng, supra note 82.
259. Coto. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(9) (Supp. 1981).
260. Id. at § 18-7-105.
261. Van Gerpen v. Peterson, 620 P.2d 714 (1980).
262. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115-16 (1974).
263. No. 81CV09693 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1982).
264. Id. at 6.
265. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-503 (Supp. 1981).
266. People v. Seven Thirty-five East Colfax, Inc., No. 81CV5779, slip. op. at 5-6 (Denver
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo. Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982).
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lem. The statute will still have to be amended to account for the new possi-
bility that pornographic theaters may qualify under the exemption clause.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The story of obscenity law in Colorado has been one of a legislature that
is ill-prepared for the task of drafting constitutional statutes, and a court that
is unwilling to do the job for the legislature. As a result, Colorado has not
had an enforceable obscenity statute for ten years. In the future, the legisla-
ture must avoid the seductive shortcut of selecting another state's law as a
model on which to base a new Colorado obscenity statute. Instead, legisla-
tors must be sensitive to both Colorado and federal case law in this area and
carefully scrutinize any amendments to the original bill.
